#Historiography - #Hiroshima & #Nagasaki - Part VIII

Selection of Sources

The sheer volume of sources cited in relevant bibliographies is impressive. Comparison between Richard Frank and Gar Alperovitz is indicative of general trends. Since Frank wrote his cited work in 1999, while Alperovitz was writing in 1965, it is better to compare sources with Alperovitz’s later work, The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb. While there is some overlap, it is surprisingly rare. Harry Truman as author, cited nine times by Alperovitz, received one citation from Frank. Alperovitz is more likely to cite primary works; diaries, committee notes, etc. However, Shapiro’s criticism of Alperovitz’s quotations noted above should be considered. The comparison is further hindered by the nature of the works. Frank was writing a narrative, while Alperovitz was advancing an argument. Thus, Alperovitz was more likely to use interpretive language like “inevitably,” “non sequitur,” and “myth,” although this cannot be considered definitive proof of bias, merely divergence of purpose and audience.

The Future of Bomb Historiography

In the conclusion to his 2016 book, Prompt and Utter Destruction, J. Samuel Walker discussed the frequent moral/immoral assertions of Hiroshima scholars. Walker stated, “No amount of historical evidence will bridge this gap; it arises to a large degree from the differing values, assumptions, priorities, and experiences that individual scholars bring to their work on the subject.” In an appendix entitled “Essay on Sources,” Walker noted the “fierce partisanship” that has often characterized the traditionalist versus revisionist polemic. He cites Frank’s Downfall as an example of recent “middle ground” scholarship. “By demonstrating serious deficiencies in both [traditionalist and revisionist arguments], they have provided much needed correctives to the over-simplified formulas and overheated arguments at the poles of the debate.” His essay is a valuable resource on topical historiography.

The topic also continues to be influenced by personal memory and experience. An estimated 325,000 World War II veterans remain alive in 2020. Many recall something to the effect of “I was on a troop ship headed for the invasion when the bomb saved my life.” Countless more grew up hearing such stories from fathers, uncles, brothers, and old neighbors pontificating on neighborhood porches. In 1988, Paul Fussell published a collection of essays entitled Thank God for the Atomic Bomb. In the eponymous essay, Fussell posited “the importance of experience, sheer, vulgar experience, in influencing, if not determining, one’s views about that use of the atomic bomb.” If history is to be inclusive, these perspectives cannot be ignored. As that experience passes from first person reality to second-hand memory, will its effect on the collective memory pass with it? Current scholarship indicates it will not.

On 4 January 2010, Tsutomu Yamaguchi died at the age of 93. To date, he is the only person certified by the Japanese government as a survivor of both Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

#Historiography - #Hiroshima and #Nagasaki Part VII

Traditionalists versus Revisionists

While scholarship is often categorized in terms of the military necessity of the bombings, the realities are more nuanced. Revisionists provide substantial evidence that political considerations were significant, but few address the issue of what effect, if any, this American nuclear advantage may have had on the subsequent Cold War. Most scholars acknowledge that the reasoning behind the bombings, and their effects, were multi-faceted. Implicit in most revisionist works is the assumption that, if it can be proved the bombings were primarily motivated by political and strategic considerations regarding Russian diplomacy, they were therefore illegitimate and immoral. Likewise, if the author’s morals discourage civilian casualties, justification for the bombings on any grounds will be difficult. Research on this topic will frequently reveal some form of the statement that “the overwhelming consensus of historians” now believe the bombings were unjustified. This is more a reflection of modern opinion of warfare in general than evidence of a scholarly monolith.

#Historiography - #Hiroshima and #Nagasaki Part VI

Renewed Traditionalism

Although Dr. Alperovitz’s work was widely lauded by a sympathetic audience, his provocative assertions attracted traditionalist scrutiny. In a 1978 article for Naval War College Review, Seton Hall professor Edward S. Shapiro argued that Alperovitz’s assertions were not new, many having been asserted by British physicist P. M. S. Blackett in 1948. Alperovitz could, however, be credited for his “copious documentation and aura of scholarly objectivity.” But coming as it did against the backdrop of American engagement in another conflict with a technologically and militarily inferior Asian enemy, Shapiro implied that Alperovitz may have intended portray the bombings as the origin of American diplomatic blunders that led to the Vietnam conflict, or worse, as an “example of American moral insensitivity and racism”39 at a time when the United States was deep in the throes of the Civil Rights movement. Shapiro called Alperovitz’s work “very much a product of radical sensibility of the 1960s,” and argued that Alperovitz’s greatest achievement may have been his impact “on some of the textbooks currently being used in university courses in American history,”41 though he cited no examples.

Shapiro believed Alperovitz mischaracterized quotes from such military authorities as General Douglas MacArthur and Admiral William Leahy. MacArthur had stated after the war that the atomic bomb was militarily unnecessary, “if by ‘unnecessary’ is meant not essential for ultimate victory.” MacArthur, and many U. S. officials, believed that the eventual defeat of Japan had been assured well prior to August, 1945. The timing and tactics necessary to achieve victory, however, were a matter of intense speculation. Admiral Leahy opposed the bombings because he believed that the naval blockade would successfully starve Japan into submission before any planned invasion became necessary. Shapiro claimed that Leahy’s autobiography stated his objection being “partially because he doubted it (the bomb) would in fact work,” and that Leahy admitted that continued conventional bombing and the blockade might have taken longer.” Given Frank’s air raid bombing findings noted earlier, it is difficult to argue fewer lives would have been lost. Indeed, Hiroshima and Nagasaki would likely have suffered similar raids, in which case many of the same individuals killed by the atomic bombs would have died.

In 1999, noted historian Richard B. Frank released Downfall: The End of the Imperial Japanese Empire, an extensive examination of the final months of the Pacific war. Frank began with the 9-10 March 1945 firebombing of Tokyo. For more than 8 pages, Frank described the event in chilling detail, and a horrific death toll. “Prior to March 10, there had been only 1,292 deaths from all air raids on Tokyo,” but on this night, Frank cited multiple death tolls from various authorities ranging from 79,466 to 100,000. By November 1945, the Hiroshima prefecture police would release an official death toll of 78,150. Like Harper, Frank asserted that newly inaugurated U. S. President Harry S. Truman may have felt the weight of Roosevelt’s shadow. Truman’s own biographer said “it was not just that the greatest of men had fallen, but that the least of men –or at any rate the least likely of men- had assumed his place.” Psychological considerations aside, Truman had real reason to fear a potentially bloody invasion of the Japanese Home Islands. Former President Herbert Hoover urged Truman to soften his stance on unconditional surrender, feared “‛500,000 to 1,000,000’ American fatalities,” although Lt. General Thomas Handy labeled this catastrophic prediction “entirely too high.” Frank noted, however, that “the heaviest loss of the war [was] in March 1945.” Hoover may be forgiven if reports from Iwo Jima and Okinawa affected his views. Advocates of avoiding an invasion pointed to the expectation of a fanatical resistance by the Japanese on their home soil. Japanese officials had instituted self-defense drills for civilians, saying “Even killing just one American soldier will do… THERE ARE NO CIVILIANS IN JAPAN” [emphasis in original]. Japanese Prime Minister Kantaro Suzuki urged a hard line against the Americans, believing the Allies would shortly be forced to end the war for their ownreasons, saying on July 30, “Precisely at a time like this, if we hold firm, they will yield before we do.” Clearly, Japanese high command was not unanimously seeking the emergency exit.

Frank argued that the U. S. had reason to suspect the sincerity of Japanese peace overtures that Alperovitz esteemed so highly. “Americans of all ranks remembered very well the image of Japanese diplomats in ostensible parlays for peace” during the 1941 bombing of Pearl Harbor. Nor was the Hiroshima bombing on 6 August immediately decisive. Frank stated that as late as the night of 8 August, “The government of Japan had not met formally to reassess the situation with the advent of the atomic bomb.” It would, in fact, take the Soviet invasion of Manchuria in the early morning hours of 9 August, and another 23,753-45,000 dead from the atomic bombing of Nagasaki later that morning, before the Japanese would surrender to Allied demands. Even after Japanese Emperor Hirohito announced his decision (breaking a deadlock among Japanese civil and military leaders) to surrender, Japanese Minister of War, Korechika Anami, in an announcement to the Army Ministry, stated, “I do not know what excuse I can offer but it is the decision of His Majesty that we accept the Potsdam Proclamation…. Your individual feelings and those of the men under you must be disregarded.” While the ultimate terms of the surrender may not be considered “unconditional,” the assertion that Japan was on the verge of surrender before the atomic bombings is not supported by the preponderance of the evidence. Further, the Americans were in no mood to spare Japanese feelings. Resentment over Pearl Harbor lingered, appalling casualties had been suffered in multiple Pacific island assaults, and an estimated 17.2 million deaths had been caused by Japanese aggression from 1931 to 1945, 10 million in China alone. Public opinion polls in America in October 1945 showed 85% approval, with fully 23% believing more bombs should have been dropped. Frank called the revisionist argument that the choice in 1945 was only between the atomic bomb and the horrific slaughter of a ground invasion “one of the most basic misconceptions of the military realities in 1945.” Admiral Leahy’s oft-quoted post-war assertion that the “use of this barbarous weapon at Hiroshima was of no material assistance in our war against Japan”59 was, for Frank, difficult to reconcile with Leahy’s support of Allied firebombing, and a naval blockade that was starving civilians and soldiers alike.

#Historiography : #Hiroshima & #Nagasaki Part V

Forty years after the war, renewed scholarship on the topic flourished in the mid-1980s. In the Summer-Fall, 1985 issue of the School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) Review, John L. Harper, then-visiting professor of U. S. foreign policy at Johns Hopkins University, reexamined the 1947 article by Stimson defending the use of the atomic bomb. Although he acknowledged Stimson was qualified to treat on the subject of America’s decision to deploy atomic weapons, he faulted Stimson’s failure to address why the bombings were preferred to alternative measures to bring the war to an end. Harper cited, as many revisionists do, the conclusions of the SBS that Japan would have surrendered in late 1945, regardless of other factors such as the atomic bomb and the entry of the Soviets into the war in Manchuria. Harper did note that the SBS assumed continued U. S. conventional bombing in the intervening months prior to a hypothetical Japanese surrender, potentially costing more Japanese lives than the atomic bombings themselves23 (Frank documented casualties from raids on Japan’s seven largest cities at over 126,000 dead and more than 1.4 million dwellings destroyed). Harper noted that the bombs were dropped without explicit prior warning, maximizing the expected shock of such a devastating new weapon.

Harper attributes the bombings to Truman’s concern for public opinion, which overwhelmingly supported the notion of unconditional surrender.26 He argued that the only logical reason for the Potsdam Declaration to omit the expressed intent of the U. S. government that “unconditional surrender” would not preclude retention of the Emperor, a known nonnegotiable in Japanese estimations, was that “doing so would have jeopardized the chance to employ the atomic bombs in a wartime situation.” It was this “immense psychological and diplomatic value” that led President Truman to deliberately leave the Potsdam Declaration vague regarding the fate of the Emperor. Truman’s own insecurity in the enormous shadow of recently deceased President Roosevelt, and his desire to cultivate an image of decisiveness, were significant, if not deciding, factors in Truman’s determination not to waste an opportunity to play America’s “master card.”28 He admitted that the ultimate value of the bombings may have been “that they gave the world an unforgettable preview of the future of general war,” which horrors may explain why nuclear weapons have never again been used in war.

In the fall of 1985, Rufus E. Miles, Jr., a former senior fellow of the Woodrow Wilson School at Princeton, attacked what he termed the myth that dropping the atomic bombs saved “half a million American lives” from the planned November 1945 invasion of the Japanese Home Islands. Former President Truman had asserted this prediction in his 1955 memoir. Miles cites Winston Churchill’s post-war defense of such catastrophic casualty estimates, supported by the example of the U. S. assault on Okinawa.31 Presenting a bloody invasion as the sole alternative to the atomic bombings was a flawed assumption. Irrespective of his estimation that the bombings saved fewer than 20,000 American casualties, “perhaps even zero,”32 Miles asserts four alternatives: a negotiated peace, based on terms similar to those that eventually prevailed; intensified bombing and naval blockade succeeding no later than November; a land invasion of Southern Kyushu in November 1945; and a spring 1946 invasion of Honshu. Any of these alternatives, Miles argued, would have accomplished U. S. objectives and resulted in Japanese surrender by early 1946. Miles relied on the SBS to demonstrate that such enormous casualty estimates were unwarranted. He did not address whether the bombings were “a sound decision on other grounds,” but merely that casualty estimates were not warranted.