Renewed Traditionalism
Although Dr. Alperovitz’s work was widely lauded by a sympathetic audience, his provocative assertions attracted traditionalist scrutiny. In a 1978 article for Naval War College Review, Seton Hall professor Edward S. Shapiro argued that Alperovitz’s assertions were not new, many having been asserted by British physicist P. M. S. Blackett in 1948. Alperovitz could, however, be credited for his “copious documentation and aura of scholarly objectivity.” But coming as it did against the backdrop of American engagement in another conflict with a technologically and militarily inferior Asian enemy, Shapiro implied that Alperovitz may have intended portray the bombings as the origin of American diplomatic blunders that led to the Vietnam conflict, or worse, as an “example of American moral insensitivity and racism”39 at a time when the United States was deep in the throes of the Civil Rights movement. Shapiro called Alperovitz’s work “very much a product of radical sensibility of the 1960s,” and argued that Alperovitz’s greatest achievement may have been his impact “on some of the textbooks currently being used in university courses in American history,”41 though he cited no examples.
Shapiro believed Alperovitz mischaracterized quotes from such military authorities as General Douglas MacArthur and Admiral William Leahy. MacArthur had stated after the war that the atomic bomb was militarily unnecessary, “if by ‘unnecessary’ is meant not essential for ultimate victory.” MacArthur, and many U. S. officials, believed that the eventual defeat of Japan had been assured well prior to August, 1945. The timing and tactics necessary to achieve victory, however, were a matter of intense speculation. Admiral Leahy opposed the bombings because he believed that the naval blockade would successfully starve Japan into submission before any planned invasion became necessary. Shapiro claimed that Leahy’s autobiography stated his objection being “partially because he doubted it (the bomb) would in fact work,” and that Leahy admitted that continued conventional bombing and the blockade might have taken longer.” Given Frank’s air raid bombing findings noted earlier, it is difficult to argue fewer lives would have been lost. Indeed, Hiroshima and Nagasaki would likely have suffered similar raids, in which case many of the same individuals killed by the atomic bombs would have died.
In 1999, noted historian Richard B. Frank released Downfall: The End of the Imperial Japanese Empire, an extensive examination of the final months of the Pacific war. Frank began with the 9-10 March 1945 firebombing of Tokyo. For more than 8 pages, Frank described the event in chilling detail, and a horrific death toll. “Prior to March 10, there had been only 1,292 deaths from all air raids on Tokyo,” but on this night, Frank cited multiple death tolls from various authorities ranging from 79,466 to 100,000. By November 1945, the Hiroshima prefecture police would release an official death toll of 78,150. Like Harper, Frank asserted that newly inaugurated U. S. President Harry S. Truman may have felt the weight of Roosevelt’s shadow. Truman’s own biographer said “it was not just that the greatest of men had fallen, but that the least of men –or at any rate the least likely of men- had assumed his place.” Psychological considerations aside, Truman had real reason to fear a potentially bloody invasion of the Japanese Home Islands. Former President Herbert Hoover urged Truman to soften his stance on unconditional surrender, feared “‛500,000 to 1,000,000’ American fatalities,” although Lt. General Thomas Handy labeled this catastrophic prediction “entirely too high.” Frank noted, however, that “the heaviest loss of the war [was] in March 1945.” Hoover may be forgiven if reports from Iwo Jima and Okinawa affected his views. Advocates of avoiding an invasion pointed to the expectation of a fanatical resistance by the Japanese on their home soil. Japanese officials had instituted self-defense drills for civilians, saying “Even killing just one American soldier will do… THERE ARE NO CIVILIANS IN JAPAN” [emphasis in original]. Japanese Prime Minister Kantaro Suzuki urged a hard line against the Americans, believing the Allies would shortly be forced to end the war for their ownreasons, saying on July 30, “Precisely at a time like this, if we hold firm, they will yield before we do.” Clearly, Japanese high command was not unanimously seeking the emergency exit.
Frank argued that the U. S. had reason to suspect the sincerity of Japanese peace overtures that Alperovitz esteemed so highly. “Americans of all ranks remembered very well the image of Japanese diplomats in ostensible parlays for peace” during the 1941 bombing of Pearl Harbor. Nor was the Hiroshima bombing on 6 August immediately decisive. Frank stated that as late as the night of 8 August, “The government of Japan had not met formally to reassess the situation with the advent of the atomic bomb.” It would, in fact, take the Soviet invasion of Manchuria in the early morning hours of 9 August, and another 23,753-45,000 dead from the atomic bombing of Nagasaki later that morning, before the Japanese would surrender to Allied demands. Even after Japanese Emperor Hirohito announced his decision (breaking a deadlock among Japanese civil and military leaders) to surrender, Japanese Minister of War, Korechika Anami, in an announcement to the Army Ministry, stated, “I do not know what excuse I can offer but it is the decision of His Majesty that we accept the Potsdam Proclamation…. Your individual feelings and those of the men under you must be disregarded.” While the ultimate terms of the surrender may not be considered “unconditional,” the assertion that Japan was on the verge of surrender before the atomic bombings is not supported by the preponderance of the evidence. Further, the Americans were in no mood to spare Japanese feelings. Resentment over Pearl Harbor lingered, appalling casualties had been suffered in multiple Pacific island assaults, and an estimated 17.2 million deaths had been caused by Japanese aggression from 1931 to 1945, 10 million in China alone. Public opinion polls in America in October 1945 showed 85% approval, with fully 23% believing more bombs should have been dropped. Frank called the revisionist argument that the choice in 1945 was only between the atomic bomb and the horrific slaughter of a ground invasion “one of the most basic misconceptions of the military realities in 1945.” Admiral Leahy’s oft-quoted post-war assertion that the “use of this barbarous weapon at Hiroshima was of no material assistance in our war against Japan”59 was, for Frank, difficult to reconcile with Leahy’s support of Allied firebombing, and a naval blockade that was starving civilians and soldiers alike.
No comments:
Post a Comment